Surely one of the most important missing pieces of the current recovery is faster wage growth in response to the tighter job market. Well, last week’s strong jobs report hinted that wage growth could finally be ticking up, at least on average, though it’s too soon to tell for sure. These monthly numbers jump around a bit, but the yearly growth rate of average hourly wages has been slowly picking up speed since June, when it was 2%, through last month, when it was up 2.5%. These are all nominal values, but as inflation has been so unusually low, they imply more purchasing power.
This is not an entirely surprising development for those of us who have long argued that full employment is associated with higher pay, as employers, like it or not, must at some point offer higher compensation if they want to get and keep the workers they need to meet the demands for their goods or services.
That said, we’re not at full employment yet, at least by my preferred measure—the one cooked up by economist Andy Levin, which takes account of unemployment, involuntary part-timers, and those missing in action from the labor force. Each of those variables has contributed labor market slack in recent years, but the second two are left out of the traditional unemployment measure. At its peak in late 2009, the slack variable was 7 percentage points (ppts) above full employment. Now it’s 2 ptts above the target.
In order to quantify some of these musings, I’ve built a simple model of wage growth using our combined 5-series wage mashup (to generate a composite picture of wage growth), and regressed yearly changes of that measure against Levin slack, slack squared (as GS economist David Mericle has uncovered non-linearites is this relationship), and a few (3) lags of the wage-growth variable. I then project that the slack variable will continue along its recent downslope until it hits zero in late 2018.
The figure below shows that the model tracks the wage-growth series well, and it also picks up the recent acceleration, again suggesting that we may be at the cusp of faster average wage growth.
Annual wage growth and forecast
Projecting forward, the model predicts that at full employment nominal wages are growing at a rate of about 3.5% (the reason wage growth flattens at this point is because I don’t allow the slack measure to go below zero*). That 3.5 is an interesting number because it’s the wage target mentioned by Fed chair Yellen and others: it is the sum of underlying productivity growth (1.5%) and the Fed’s inflation target (2%), implying real average wages growing at the rate of productivity, aka steady unit labor costs.
OK, caveats abound: the model is very simple and could of course be wrong; who says we’ll get to full employment, especially if the Fed gets nervous and does more than just tap the breaks?; this will have to be among the longest of expansions if we’re to get to full employment by late 2018; as I’ve stressed, this is the average—in the age of inequality, the average takes off well before the median.
That said, work I’ve done with Dean Baker finds that if we can get to and stay at full employment for a while, the benefits in terms of wage growth will disproportionately go to middle and lower paid workers, including racial minorities (as economist Valerie Wilson has shown). They’re the ones with the least bargaining power in slack labor markets and thus with the most to gain from full employment.
Won’t this drive faster inflation? I don’t expect so. First, the reason 3.5% is the Yellen wage target is because real wage growth at the rate of productivity growth is not inflationary—productivity absorbs the real wage gains. One potentially problematic wrinkle here is that assumed trend productivity growth rate—1.5%–is…um…well above current trend productivity growth.
But more to the point, the evidence for wage-push inflation is just increasingly elusive. There’s now a number of solid, econometric studies questioning the importance of wage-price pass through; it’s actually pretty hard to find it in the data.
So, fear not rising wages. Fear them not at the average. Fear them not at the median or 20th percentile. Fear them not in a box…fear them not with a fox.
Whoops…got away from me a bit there at the end, but you get the picture.
And speaking of the picture above, here are the data if you want to play along at home.
*Zero on the Levin measure means that unemployment is at its “natural rate” according to CBO, and the involuntary unemployed and labor force participation have returned to the their pre-recession trend levels.
I’m a noob (newbie) when it comes to models – econoblogs being a hobby – but is there a way to figure in the Fed reaction function? The Fed says it wants to raise .25 pts every other meeting (probably starting in December). Congress has a budget deal for now. I guess the variables depend partly on how financial conditions tighten. They’ve tightened and the dollar has gotten stronger beginning with Bernanke’s taper talk up through the current liftoff discussion. There’s the question of productivity growth as you mention. There’s also the question of how soon tightening labor markets will translate to greater worker bargaining power.
As Dean Baker points out regularly, in the 1990s unemployment went down to 4 percent without significant inflation. Krugman used to talk about how in the 1970s unions were strong enough to negotiate price-hikes into future contracts which helped along inflation. That’s no longer the case (I’d say unfortunately.)
Jared, your conundrum seems to be that an economy near full employment along with modestly increasing wages are not combining to inspire any degree of widespread price inflation as predicted by your models.
My question is this: Do your models account for the eagerness of the beneficiaries of all that “full employment plus higher wages” to pay off old debt rather than spend, spend, spend their recent gains? In short, are workers giving their gains to banks rather than retailers?
Perhaps your general price inflation models should include a major factor that will increase only once workers are relieved of their indebtedness.
This assumes the 1% will willingly turn over 100% of productivity gains. The evidence for this is non-existent, they do just the opposite and take 100% (a tiny bit also goes to the top 10%). They go even further by taking more than 100% thus eating into low income wages.
Barring substantial policy change brought about by political realignment, projections showing sustained 3.5% wage gains are not to be believed.
There is presently a glut, a surplus of college graduates, not hard to imagine when 2/3 of all job openings through 2022 require a high school diploma or less according to the BLS. Ironically, the college grads in minimum wage jobs broadens support for higher minimums.
Only tea party intransigence prevented the Democrats from passing a new immigration bill effectively tripling the number of high skills immigrants. That would have enlarged exploited foreign worker share to roughly 25% of the 1.2 million openings for high skills jobs, due to doubling H1B and new point system requiring employer sponsorship instead of family connections for immigration. see also http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/us/large-companies-game-h-1b-visa-program-leaving-smaller-ones-in-the-cold.html
Aside from measures to repress labor, business could also raise prices at will. In a replay of that 70s show, a lack of competition could create a wage price spiral instead of sustained wage gains. Democrats have zero plans to deal with this.
The power of money, the power of big business, corporations and high tech, the still increasing vulnerability of labor to off shoring, out sourcing, in sourcing, the exploitation of immigrant labor the Democrats plans to expand that exploitation under the guise of reform, all point to the impossibility of anything like 3.5% wage growth, broadly distributed, sustained, and without out spiraling inflation.
Auto workers, miners, and long shoremen died fighting for labor rights. Today, the standard of living is too high, and work is too safe for office workers to fight for a 3% raise instead of a 2% raise.
Of course the plight of the lower tier of the dying middle class is another story. http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/why-is-the-death-rate-rising-among-middle-aged-white-americans